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ABSTRACT
As the two most important modes in public transpor-
tation, the coordinated development of bus and metro 
networks significantly influences the efficiency of public 
transportation. However, two parallel bus and metro lines 
belonging to different operators may lead to supply competi-
tion and consequently yield over-supply. Taking two parallel 
bus and metro lines in Harbin city, China as a case study, 
this paper, drawing on game theory, establishes a utility 
model based on the two lines’ frequencies, and reveals and 
explains the fundamental reason for the over-supply prob-
lem using a Nash equilibrium. In an attempt to resolve this 
issue, the study proposes a new operation mode: integrating 
frequencies of the two modes to obtain larger total profits 
then reallocating the total profits to the two modes. The case 
study shows that this new operation mode can effectively 
solve the over-supply problem while satisfying both opera-
tors of the two modes, and hence having practical value. 
KEY WORDS
public transportation; supply competition; Nash equilibrium; 
over-supply; game theory; China;
1. INTRODUCTION
The two main modes of urban public transportation 
in China are buses and metros. With the expanding ur-
ban scale and socioeconomic development, the met-
ro has received considerable government attention. 
As of 2014, the metro operates in 20 cities in China, 
and the total mileage it covers is 2,361 kilometres [1]. 
However, the rapid development of the metro appears 
to have impacted the existing bus system. Thus, ad-
dressing the relationship between the two modes has 
become an important issue.
The extant literature mostly focuses on the coordi-
nated development between the bus and metro sys-
tem. Sun et al. studied the integration of the bus and 
metro network using multiple goal programming [2]. 
Chen et al. suggested unifying a transfer network for a 
more efficient transfer system for the two modes [3]. 
Chen proposed a fare linkage organism between bus 
and metro systems [4]. Jin et al. defined the resilience 
of the metro network to disruption and introduced lo-
calized integration with bus services to enhance this 
resilience [5]. However, these studies have mostly dis-
cussed the optimization of the integration of the two 
systems, and are thus restricted to the public transpor-
tation administrator point of view.
By contrast, some studies have recognized the com-
petitive relationship between the two travel modes. For 
instance, Ma et al. defined the rival area of the bus 
and metro system by passengers’ travel distances, 
but neglected the competitive game between the two 
modes [6]. Adriaan et al. analyzed how different mar-
ket structures - i.e., markets with a monopolistic public 
transportation operator and those with individual op-
erators for each public transportation link - influence 
public transportation fares and social welfare [7]. In 
some countries, such as China, public transportation 
fares are determined by the government and once 
determined, remain constant over time. Thus, the key 
competitive strategy for the operators of both public 
transportation modes is frequency, or more specifical-
ly, supply capacity. Drawing on the actual situation in 
China, Hu constructed a bi-level model: the upper level 
determines the best fare, a decision that is contingent 
on the government, and the lower model establishes 
the best frequency. Although the result of the lower 
model deviated from the Nash equilibrium for the two 
operators, it served as the optimal solution [8]. Using 
evolutionary game theory, Li described changes in the 
level of competition between the bus and metro sys-
tems based on the scale of metro mileage in a city; 
however, their study does not discuss measures spe-
cific to competition, and mostly offers qualitative de-
scriptions [9].
Traffic in the Cities
Original Scientific Paper
Submitted: Sep. 7, 2015
Accepted: Apr. 12, 2016
SHUMIN FENG, Ph.D.1
E-mail: zlyfsm2000@sina.com 
XIANGHAO SHEN, Ph.D. candidate1
(Corresponding author)
E-mail: shen.27@163.com
BAOYU HU, Ph.D. candidate1
E-mail: hubaoyu87@163.com
1 School of Transportation Science and Engineering
 Harbin Institute of Technology.
 No. 73 Huanghe Road, Harbin, Heilongjiang, 150090, 
 The People’s Republic of China
OVER-SUPPLY IN PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION: CASE STUDY 
OF BUS AND METRO LINES IN HARBIN CITY, CHINA
472 Promet – Traffic&Transportation, Vol. 28, 2016, No. 5, 471-477
S. Feng, X. Shen, B. Hu: Over-supply in Public Transportation: Case Study of Bus and Metro Lines in Harbin City, China
Duplicate bus and metro lines are rather common 
in China, such as bus line 1 and metro line 1 in Beijing 
or bus line 104 and metro line 1 in Harbin city, and the 
rate of repetition between the two modes’ stations is 
more than 85% for the entire line. The rationale under-
lying the parallel operations of various travel modes 
is the provision of diverse traffic channels to improve 
the reliability of the public transportation system and 
perfecting the system so that it is more attractive to 
passengers. However, because it is often the case that 
bus and metro systems have different operators in Chi-
na, and as opposed to private transportation they face 
a relatively similar passenger market, competition 
between the two modes for passengers is inevitable. 
Assume that network, fare, and transfer facilities have 
been determined, and the bus and metro operators 
have relative control over dispatch frequency; in other 
words, the two modes mainly compete in frequency. 
Assume that a certain area is served by two paral-
lel bus and metro lines and both operators can freely 
control dispatch frequency as long as it is within the 
scope of their capacity and satisfies travel demand. 
Due to the limited passenger flow demand, the aver-
age benefit of a single trip for the two modes is relative 
to total frequency and has a negative correlation when 
input capacity reaches a certain value, after which an 
additional trip can result in a decline in total benefit. 
When determining frequency, traffic operators should 
consider not only the influence of one more trip on rev-
enue but also its effects on the other operator’s choice 
of strategy; this can be seen as a typical game process.
In an ideal scenario, the competition between 
the two modes is not encouraged due to the risk of 
over-supply and the lack of efficiency in the public 
transport system; hence, a new method that dimin-
ishes the influence of competition is needed. In this 
paper, we examine two parallel bus and metro lines 
and use game theory to analyze the capacity strat-
egies between the two modes, and propose a new 
operation mode that enhances the efficiency of the 
public transportation system. The method can also be 
expanded to a bi-mode network to promote coordinat-
ed development of public transportation, and serve as 
a theoretical support for public transportation admin-
istrators and operators. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 provides the main methodology of the paper. 
Section 3 introduces the game model for bus and met-
ro supplies. Section 4 verifies the model with a case 
study. Section 5 analyzes the over-supply problem and 
proposes a new operation mode to resolve the prob-
lem. Section 6 provides a conclusion.
2. METHODOLOGY
In the game between two parallel bus and metro 
lines, the two players are the bus and metro operators, 
and the strategy for each player is dispatch frequency. 
The utility of each player is its profit, which is depen-
dent on its income and cost and is affected by not only 
its own strategy but also that of the other player.
For accurate game results, a rational and effective 
utility function is needed; the process used to estab-
lish such a function is shown in Figure 1. First, consider 
a rational travel mode choice model, and calculate the 
average passenger flow of each trip under different 
frequency strategies adopted by operators, which pro-
vides a series of average passenger numbers for each 
trip corresponding to each frequency combination. 
Second, by conducting a multiple regression analysis 
using the obtained data, establish a function that illus-
trates the relationship between passenger volume for 
one trip (dependent variable) and different frequency 
portfolios (independent variables). Finally, considering 
the operation cost of each trip and revenue from the 
fares, build a profit function for the operator of each 
mode; this function can also be regarded as a utility 
function.
Given the common passenger market, it is as-
sumed that the utility functions are common to both 





Travel mode choice 
model
Calculate passenger volume 
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Figure 1 – Process of establishing a utility function 
Source: own design
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operators. In addition, there is a certain consistency 
in passengers’ travel mode choice in the region and 
both operators can correctly judge the opponent’s 
utility function on the basis of the operating cost and 
passenger fare.
Once a utility function is defined for each operator, 
the Nash equilibrium can be obtained by using the dif-
ferential method, and using it for further analyses. 
3. MODEL FRAMEWORK
This section first describes the problem. Then, a 
two-step modelling framework is presented: (1) estab-
lishment of a utility function that takes the bus and 
metro frequencies as independent variables; (2) anal-
ysis of the game process for achieving a Nash equilib-
rium for the two modes.
3.1 Problem description and relative variables
Let us assume two modes of public transportation, 
bus and metro, in region D in a given period. The total 
public transportation demand in the region is Q with-
in a given time, which is a fixed value. Both operators 
regulate their dispatch frequencies, and the total ca-
pacity of the two modes can satisfy Q. A passenger’s 
choice of travel mode is affected by the frequency of 
each mode. The cost of each trip and fare per passen-
ger for both travel modes is fixed; considering that we 
study the case of Harbin city, we set the metro fare to 
be double the bus fare and its cost to be nearly 7 times 
the bus cost, as is actually the case. The profit from 
each mode is determined by passenger volume share 
and frequency. 
The notations used in the model are as follows: 
i is travel mode, where i=1 indicates a bus and i=2 
indicates a metro; xi denotes the frequency, or trips 
per hour, and depends on the operator and xmaxi is the 
maximum value of xi; qi is the maximum passenger vol-
ume per trip; si and di are supply and demand quanti-
ties, respectively, and ui= si - di. Ri represents the ac-
tual passenger volume carried by mode i and Pi is the 
passenger share in mode i; Pi is the actual passenger 
volume for one trip using mode i; yi denotes fare, Ci is 
operation costs (mainly labour costs, oil (electric) fees, 
and depreciation cost of equipment), and πi is mode 
i’s profit.
It is noteworthy that Ci excludes fixed costs that do 
not vary by frequency, such as station fees for the bus 
stops and lighting fees at metro stations.
3.2 Utility function
Using the process described in Figure 1, we define 
the utility functions of the modes as follows:
,P f x xi 1 2= ^ h  (1)
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Equations 1 and 2 indicate the travel demand for 
mode i and function f(x1,x2) is the travel mode choice 
model, which is affected by bus and metro frequen-
cies. Equation 3 gives the supply quantity and Equa-
tions 4 through 6 denote actual passenger volume for 
each mode. Given a certain frequency, the actual ac-
ceptance of passenger volume is restricted to supply 
capacity. That is, if there is a surplus in bus capacity 
and the metro frequency is insufficient for available 
demand, the additional passengers will be transferred 
to the bus and vice versa. Constraint 7 indicates that 
the total passenger volume for both modes should 
meet total public transportation demand Q. Equation 8 
gives the calculation of the actual passenger volume 
per trip, which is deemed a dependent variable in 
the regression analysis. Equation 9 gives the possible 
choice of xi. 
According to Equations 1 through 9, a series of yi 
corresponding to each xi combination can be obtained 
for different frequency combinations for both modes. 
Here, we ignore the requirement that yi and xi should 
be integers; this does not affect the analysis results. 
Then, by taking xi as the independent variable and yi 
as the dependent variable, we obtain Equations 10 and 
11 from a multiple regression analysis:
y B x x1 1 1 1 1 2~ i= - -K  (10)
y B x x1 22 2 2 2~ i= - -K  (11)
Using the two equations, we formulate the utility 
functions for the two modes:
,x x F x y C x*1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1$ $ $r = -^ h K  (12)
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,x x F x y C x* 1 22 2 2 2 2 2$ $ $r = -^ h K  (13)
3.3 Nash equilibrium
If ,x x* *1 2^ h  is a Nash equilibrium, to obtain the equi-
librium strategies, we first calculate the derivation of 
the utility function for each mode and set it as 0 (Equa-
tions 14 and 15). The solution for the simultaneous 
equations is the Nash equilibrium ,x x* *1 2^ h [10].
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Figure 2 – Reaction functions for the optimal frequencies 
and the Nash equilibrium 
Source: own design
To better understand the Nash equilibrium, 
we introduce the concept of a reaction function 
(Figure 2). If the frequency of metro x2 is given, then 











 Thus, when x2 is fixed, the optimal 
output can be expressed as x k x211 = ^ h , that is, x 1  
is the best strategy when x2 is given as the bus op-
erator’s reaction function. Similarly, we define the re-
action function x k x2 2 1= ^ h  for the metro. Given that 
the utility function is linear, the two reaction functions 
are shown as two lines in Figure 2 and the point of in-
tersection is the Nash equilibrium.
4. CASE STUDY
In this section, we apply the proposed modelling 
framework to analyze the game process of the supply 
strategies of two parallel bus and metro lines in the 
city of Harbin, China, and assess the feasibility of the 
modelling framework by comparing with actual oper-
ations.
4.1 Base data and travel mode choice model
We take as an example the competition between 
bus line 104, operated by Harbin Public Trolley Com-
pany, and metro line 1, run by Harbin Metro Operating 
Company, in Harbin city, China. The length of bus line 
104 is 16.9 km and that of metro line 1 is 17.4 km, 
with both running parallel for 15.8 km. The objective 
time is from 9:00 to 10:00, the total demand for public 
transportation is Q=600, and the possible frequency 
of the two modes is x1∈[1,30] and x2∈[1,20] during 
this period.
The logit model based on random utility theory is 
the most widely used among the existing travel choice 
models [11]. Thus, this study also adopts the logit 
model to describe the travel behaviour. Since there are 
only two types of travel modes, we adopt the following 































Vi= - 1.22Ti - 0.231Fi + 0.337Ei      i=1,2 (17)
Equation 17 is the traveller’s utility function ob-
tained from survey data. Ti indicates travel time and 
is composed of the average waiting time Tiw  and in-ve-
hicle time Tir  (see Equation 18). Tiw  is determined by 
frequency xi (see Equation 19):







w $=  (19)
Table 1 – Value of relevant variables
Variable Value Unit Variable Value Unit
q1 160 p q2 1500 p
F1 1 yuan F2 2 yuan
Tr1 0.63 h Tr2 0.35 h
E1 1 - E2 3 -
C1 85 yuan C2 600 yuan
Source: own formulation
Fi is the fare of mode i per passenger; Ei is the qual-
itatively determined value of the overall environment 
for mode i, developed by mainly considering comfort, 
convenience, and reliability, where the value of Ei rang-
es from 1 (poor environment) to 5 (comfortable envi-
ronment). This study assumes a private car to be the 
most comfortable mode of transportation, and accord-
ingly, sets the travel environment value of a bus to 1 
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and that of the metro to 3. Other related variables are 
shown in Table 1.
4.2 Game process
Inserting the relevant variables into Equations 1 
through 9, we obtain a series of y1, y2 corresponding to 
x1, x2. Because x 30
max
1 =  and x 02max2 = , there are a 
total of 600 types of strategy combinations, excluding 
the ones that do not satisfy restraint 7, which leaves us 
with a total of 545 types of combinations. Using these 



























R2 indicates the goodness of fit and all coefficients 
of the regression functions satisfy the t-test at the 
0.01 level. Next, incorporating Equations 12 and 13, 
and given the requirement of the first derivation, we 
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Solving the above equation provides us a Nash 
equilibrium solution:
. , .x x12 73 13 7 75 8* *1 2. .= =
Then, inserting them in the following utility function 
gives us the results presented in Table 2:
xF x y C **i ii i i i$ $ $r = -  (23)
Table 2 – Nash equilibrium results
i xi yi πi
1 13 147 808
2 8 511 3,375
Source: own calculation
According to the survey, the actual bus frequen-
cy is 15 trips per hour, which is slightly higher than 
the game result. This can be attributed to the fuel 
subsidy implemented by China’s government, which 
reduces operating cost to less than 85 yuan per trip 
for a bus. The lower cost may result in the increase 
in frequency. As for the metro, the actual frequency 
is eight trips per hour, which is consistent with the 
game result. Overall, the simulation results coincide 
with the actual operations, and thus, the game model 
can be considered feasible and accurate. Because the 
specific number of fuel subsidies could not be ob-
tained from the available open information, in a later 
analysis in Section 5, we continue to set the frequency 
of the Nash equilibrium to 13 trips per hour.
5. RESULT AND DISCUSSION
The optimal solution for individual operators as per 
game results is the Nash equilibrium. However, it may 
not be optimal from the perspectives of a traffic chan-
nel’s total profit. Suppose the goal is to maximize total 
channel profits and to ensure a single trip is not too 
crowded or empty. In this case, we set one-trip capac-
ity constraints as y1∈[80,130]. y2∈[500,1000], which 
should also satisfy Equations 1 through 9. Then, the 
optimal solution in terms of frequency is 16 trips per 
hour for buses and 4 trips per hour for metros, with a 
total channel profit of 6,215 yuan. However, an optimal 
solution may not be preferable as the goal is to foster 
metro passenger flow by increasing its frequency, and 
thus, a satisfactory solution is chosen: six trips per 
hour. A comparison of the three solutions is shown in 
Table 3.
According to Table 1, the capacity per trip values of 
the two modes are q1=160 and q2=1,500, respective-
ly; the supply capacity of mode i can now be written as 
si= qi· xi .Thus, the value of (s1+ s2) in Table 3 can be ob-
tained; the bus fare is 1 yuan per passenger and metro 
fare is 2 yuan per passenger, and the cost of the bus is 
85 yuan per trip and that of the metro is 600 yuan per 
trip. Then, according to Equation 23, we can calculate 
π1 and π2, and obtain the value of (π1+ π2) in the table.
As shown in the table, in comparison to the optimal 
and satisfactory solutions, the Nash equilibrium pro-
vides the highest supply and obtains the lowest prof-
its, which can be regarded as the over-supply problem. 
Such a situation can be explained by using two game 
models, the Cournot competition model and the “trag-
edy of the commons” model.
Under Cournot competition, there are two firms 
producing homogeneous products and supplying the 
same market. Firms simultaneously compete in quan-
tity, and generally, seek to maximize profits on the 
basis of their competitor’s decision. In such a situa-
tion, competition may result in greater total output but 
Table 3 – Comparison of the three solutions
x1 x2 y1 y2 s1+ s2 π1 π2 π1+ π2
Nash equilibrium 13 8 147 511 14,080 808 3,375 4,182
Optimal solution 16 4 127 998 8,560 665 5,550 6,215
Satisfactory solution 16 6 122 674 11,560 597 4,485 5,082
Source: own calculation
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lower total profits as compared to under a monopoly. 
Although traffic services offered by the bus and metro 
systems are not entirely homogeneous, both compete 
in a similar service market. This study establishes 
a game model using frequency as the strategy, which 
is similar to output, and thus, the results of Cournot 
competition can also be used to illustrate the over-sup-
ply problem resulting from competition between the 
two modes of transport.
Second is the tragedy of the commons model. 
According to the model, public products with unclear 
property rights can be used by anyone and may lead to 
the excessive use of a resource. For example, suppose 
that n farmers co-owned a piece of grassland. Each 
farmer has the freedom to herd sheep on the grass, 
and accordingly, every farmer plans the number of 
sheep for spring. Due to the existence of a competitive 
relationship, the total number of sheep from n farm-
ers will be greater than the optimum feeding amount 
that does not damage the resource. Thus, the model 
explains two problems: overuse of public resource and 
excessive number of sheep on the grass; this also ap-
plies to the bus and metro systems. Assume that grass 
resources are bus and metro passengers, farmers are 
the operators, and herding sheep denotes trips. In this 
case, over-herding is synonymous with the over-supply 
problem. In other words, in a competitive environment, 
the total amount of output for a bus and metro will be 
higher than the best supply value.
As shown from the case study results, the Nash 
equilibrium is not the optimal or satisfactory solution 
because it entails over-supply of transportation capac-
ity. As a solution, the tragedy of the commons model 
suggests clarifying a clear and stable property for the 
public resource (passengers); however, this model is 
not useful in the case of public transportation because 
passengers cannot be coerced into choosing a specif-
ic travel mode. As for the Cournot competition mod-
el, we see that, as compared to duopoly competition, 
monopoly operations can reduce supply and increase 
profits. Thus, drawing on this theory, we suggest an 
“integrated-supply, profit-reallocation” model to solve 
the over-supply problem resulting from competition. 
Figure 3 is a comparison of the existing and new pat-
terns of operation.
Integrating frequencies means one of the bus 
and metro operators integrates the frequency of both 
modes. The trend in public transportation development 
suggests that the metro plays a key role, and thus, we 
propose that metro operators lead the process of in-
tegrating the capacity supply of the two modes for the 
attainment of a satisfactory solution. 
Second, the profits from frequency integration 
should be reallocated so that after reallocation, the 
profits are higher than those obtained from the Nash 
equilibrium, which is a prerequisite for the new opera-
tion mode. In fact, as Figure 3 indicates, the bus/metro 
operator’s profit after reallocation is larger than that 
under Nash equilibrium.
Next, Harbin city is used as a case study to more 
specifically explain the proposed model. First, to inte-
grate the frequencies of bus line 104 and metro line 
1, the metro operation company requests the right to 
dispatch frequency for bus line 104 from the public 
trolley company, and then, attempts to implement a 
satisfactory solution (Table 3), obtaining a total profit of 
5,082 yuan. In the next stage, the profits are reallocat-
ed. Assuming that the bus operator is allocated 1,000 
yuan, the metro operator reserves 4,082 yuan. Thus, 
both the bus and metro operators earn more revenue 
as compared to before integration. 
Unfortunately, this new operation mode increases 
the average waiting time for a metro passenger from 
3.75 minutes to 5 minutes. However, because the dif-
ference is small, we consider it to be within the accept-
able range. Furthermore, the metro operations compa-
ny can take certain measures to reduce the perception 
of waiting time, for example, by providing free news-
papers. For bus passengers, the average waiting time 
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Figure 3 – Comparison between existing and new operation patterns 
Source: own design
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6. CONCLUSION
This paper addresses the problem of over-supply 
in parallel bus and metro lines, using a case study of 
Harbin city, China. The three main conclusions are as 
follows.
1)  A game comprising two parallel bus and metro 
lines is played and supply capacity is estimated. If 
the per-passenger fare and per-trip cost are given, 
and the two modes belong to different operators, 
the players compete in frequency. The frequency 
strategy of one mode affects the utility of the other 
mode and vice versa.
2)  Accordingly, a game model is established and a 
solution for the Nash equilibrium is obtained for 
the case of Harbin city. The results give that the 
frequencies of the Nash equilibrium are in line with 
the actual operations of the two modes. However, 
the solution is not optimum with regard to social 
benefit, as there arises over-supply. Two classic 
game theory approaches - Cournot competition 
and tragedy of the commons - are applied to ex-
plain the causation of over-supply in public trans-
portation.
3) For solving the over-supply problem, a new opera-
tion mode is proposed. First, the metro operator in-
tegrates both bus and metro frequencies; the total 
profit thus obtained being larger than that obtained 
under the Nash equilibrium. Second, the obtained 
total profit is reallocated to the two operators such 
that each operator’s profit is larger than its profit 
under Nash equilibrium. Hence, the new operation 
mode is an effective solution for the over-supply 
problem. 
The theory and method proposed in this paper 
can also be extended to bus and metro networks. One 
of the factors leading to the high cost of the public 
transportation system is over-supply. Since this cost 
is shared by the government and operation firms, the 
proposed operation mode can not only improve the ef-
ficiency of the public transportation system but also 
reduce the burden of financial subsidies.
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